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Abstract
This paper examines the joint production of golf and real estate
development. The empirical results of this analysis show that, over time,
golf courses are being constructed less for recreational golf and more for
contractual assurance of green open space for homes. We believe that this
fundamentally provides some evidence that the demand for environmental
quality is growing and that markets are increasingly able to find creative
contracting mechanisms to satisfy demands for public goods.

JEL Codes: H49, Q56, R31
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I. Introduction
As people and economies grow richer, they demand enhanced
environmental quality. At least that seems to be one of the noncontroversial conclusions that can be reached from economic analysis
of environmental Kuznets curves (Yandle et al., 2004). Green space
initiatives are increasingly common on the political landscape, and the
issue is full of economics, politics, emotion, and opinion. Therefore,
we start from the position that there is some fledgling demand for
people to sequester or otherwise prevent the development of certain
areas, particularly those near housing. These areas are being
*
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preserved as open, pasture, wooded, prairie, or raw land and not
converted into commercial or residential development. We propose
that homes on golf courses may be an entrepreneurial attempt at
supplying the joint provision of golf courses along with housing on
desirable green spaces.
It is fair to say that economic analysts, pundits, and lay people
have long argued that the private, free market may regularly fail to
provide public goods such as green space, open space, parks, and
similar environmental amenities owing to the public goods and free
rider problem. While that may very well be true, we think a second
look may reveal that the growing demand for these environmental
assets may be met in unusual ways by private, profit-oriented
entrepreneurs.
We believe that there is a significant, private, demand for
environmental amenities that grows as people become wealthier.
Hence we study how markets and contract solutions might come to
meet this demand. We do this in two seemingly separate but actually
similar contexts: the demand for open, green space and the demand
for golf. One important caveat is in order. We do not intend to argue
or present evidence that the socially optimal level of collective goods
is created or produced by private demanders, but rather, that markets
are not barren when it comes to the provision of these public goods.
This is not a normative analysis.
This paper explores whether golf courses may be substitutes for
natural open green space in the eyes of some consumers and to some
extent satisfy their demands for environmental quality. Simply, are
golf courses today being constructed, in part, not only for people to
play golf, but also to provide open green space to adjacent home
owners? We remain agnostic on, and it is not the point of our paper,
whether golf courses are superior to alternative forms of green
spacing such as conservation easements, deed covenants, taxation
and regulation, or similar devices.
We start from the following factual basis. Golf course
construction proceeds at an unusually high rate given the growth in
the number of people playing golf or the amount of golf being
played. In 2000, an estimated 56,000 new homes on golf courses were
constructed at a total cost of $8.4 billion, and they make up
approximately 4 percent of the total 1.5 million homes constructed in
the United States (Golf 20/20, 2003). In fact, the golf industry
laments with some ever-increasing agony the continuing construction

F.F. Limehouse et al. / The Journal of Private Enterprise 27(2), 2012, 75–120

105

of courses with no concomitant apparent increase in the demand for
golf:
Hit with a shot of bad weather and a surge in the
construction of new courses, many golf course owners across
Wisconsin are struggling to stay below par. “We are definitely
saturated in terms of courses,” said Terianne Petzold,
executive director of the Golf Course Owners of Wisconsin,
a Milwaukee-based industry group. “We're at the point where
we're getting pretty close to full immersion. It would be nice
to figure out a way to get people to stop building.” (Brooks,
2004)
Rounds are down, player development is flat, new course
openings are half of what they were a few years ago and more
courses than ever have “For Sale” signs out front because of
overbuilding, overfinancing and over-the-top wishful thinking
by dot-com millionaire developers. (Jones, 2003)
The golf course industry seems to implicitly recognize the main
point of our inquiry:
The percentage of real-estate oriented courses, where
profitability issues can be offset by the increase in land values,
will continue to increase, and courses driven by real estate will
be more than half of the new courses added within a year or
two. (Golf 20/20, 2003, p.18)
This paper is designed to align three branches of economic
inquiry into sports economics and environmental issues. One, can
and do golf course designers and builders internalize the impact that
their construction techniques have on neighboring real estate? Two,
is it appropriate to challenge the assertion that private and free
markets always underproduce public goods? Three, is the demand for
open and green space real, and can it be quantified?
II. The Recapitalization Hypothesis
One way that real estate developers can capture the joint demand
of golf and green space is by constructing homes on golf courses and
charging price premiums for contractual assurance that the green
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space will persist. A New York Times article (Harden, 2001) indicates
that golf course construction continues to rise while growth in the
number of golfers has slowed. It states that many golf developers
enter projects knowing they will lose money in the golf operation but
make up the difference by charging price premiums at the real estate
office. Moreover, many golf developers sell their courses to
management companies once home sites are sold. Casual empiricism
suggests that many people living in golf course communities do not
play golf but simply demand the open space, and that the fraction of
people buying homes on courses who actually play golf is declining.
In this paper, we investigate, cross-sectionally, the factors that play a
role in golf courses as surrogate green spaces. We also examine data
on golf course sales that capture the recent phenomena of golf club
reevaluations.
We develop what we will call the recapitalization hypothesis. This
idea says:
1. There is an increasing demand for green space adjacent to
homes, and golf courses are surrogate green space.
2. Golf courses provide long-run assurance that green space will
persist.
3. Golf courses then add value to adjacent real estate by virtue
of their persistent green, open space provision.
4. Golf course entrepreneurs will tap this demand for green
open space and construct golf courses.
5. These new golf courses will appear to be constructed out of
hubris. That is, they will cost more than the resulting cash
flows will reveal.
6. Land values will capitalize the value of the adjacent green
open space because the new home buyers demand the open
green space and will pay resulting price premiums.
7. The golf course builder, the land developer, will capture the
overcharges on the cost of golf course construction in the
added value to the adjacent real estate.
8. Because the golf course builder is actually a real estate
developer, he will subsequently liquidate the golf course at
some fraction of its cost to an expert at managing and
running golf courses who can make a normal return on the
operation of the golf course because the initial capital outlay
for him is now lower than the original construction costs.
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9. The new buyer will be contractually obligated to maintain the
open green space into the foreseeable future.
We subject this recapitalization, environmental quality hypothesis
to testing using a comprehensive golf course database. In short, the
goal of this analysis is to examine the contractual assurance (in the
spirit of Klein and Leffler, 1981) that golf developers provide to
homeowners that demand green space and to provide evidence of a
Coasian (1960) solution in the joint production of golf courses and
real estate developments. Supposing that we find these assurances,
we will summarize these results in the framework of a market-based
solution to the demand for green space, not a demand that goes
unquenched in need of collective action. Assuming we find these
assurances, we will offer alternative explanations of the political
phenomenon we observe around us, the publicly funded green space
initiative. Lacking these assurances, we will ponder why the market
has failed to deliver that which homeowners desire and why
collective action is deemed appropriate. We expect that we may find a
mixed bag, locationally based, which may be enlightening as to why
some market locales are better than others at providing the desired
green space, the growing places, as opposed to the stable places
where few new homes are under construction.
III. Related Literature
The Coase Theorem (1960) is typically applied to what has
traditionally been defined as negative externalities where one firm’s
costs are a positive function of another’s output. The implications of
this model are that, in the case of what is usually called a positive
externality, Firm 1 will take into account its positive impact on Firm
2's profits and thus its output will be higher than that under isolated
behavior.
There exists a copious amount of empirical literature that
examines how assets without prices are sometimes captured,
internalized, and accounted for in prices and contracts. Cheung’s
(1973) classic paper on “The Fable of the Bees” responds to earlier
assertions set forth by Meade (1952) and Bator (1958) about where
apple farming and beekeeping occur next to each other. The apples
provide food for the bees, and the bees fertilize the apple crops,
creating increased value for neighbors without compensation on both
accounts. In Cheung’s analysis of bee services and nectar in
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Washington, he provides some suggestion of a Coasian solution and
shows that farmers and beekeepers do indeed contract with each
other, and the market rental prices of hives reflect what look to be
unpriced values of pollination. More recently, Muth et al. (2003)
provide further evidence that the market for beekeeper services is
well developed and that the unpriced, so-called external benefits of
pollination to many agricultural crops are not so external or unpriced.
They show, using times-series data on pollination fees, that
exogenous shocks to beekeeper costs (specifically, Varroa mite
infestations) positively influence pollination fees.
There are several papers that study how unpriced assets or
outputs affect store rent at shopping malls. Brueckner (1993)
develops a theoretical model in which a particular store’s revenue is a
function of its total floor space and the space of nearby stores. The
developer allocates space to stores so that net marginal revenue
(which accounts for what are usually called the external effects of
increasing each store’s space on rents paid by other stores) is equal to
the marginal cost of space. Brueckner’s theory states that if two
stores have the same rent elasticity of demand, the store that
generates the greater positive overall impact will pay a lower land
rent. Thus, large anchor stores that attract consumers to nearby
specialty shops are offered land rent subsidies to produce at a larger
quantity than they otherwise would in an isolated location with no
spillover effects. Pashigian and Gould (1998) use 1992 operating data
for mall stores to examine contractual arrangements between mall
developers and anchor stores. They show that the per-square-foot
rent paid by anchor stores in super-regional malls is 90 percent less
than the median per-square-foot rent paid by clothing stores and up
to 95 percent less than rents paid by food, shoe, and jewelry stores.
There is research on the impacts of unpriced assets on home
prices. Li and Brown (1980), for example, examine microneighborhood effects on housing prices. They examine aesthetic
attributes of neighborhoods, pollution levels, and proximity of homes
to local amenities such as schools, industry, parks, and bodies of
water. They use data from a sample of 781 single-family home sales
in the Boston, Massachusetts, area. They specify a linear hedonic
model of home prices regressed on home structure characteristics
(such as number of bedrooms, age of structure, lot size),
demographic attributes (such as density, per capita income), property
tax paid, and the micro-neighborhood location or unpriced asset
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variables. One of the micro-neighborhood variables is an on-site
visual index that measures homeowners’ ranking of visual quality and
views from the house. The authors estimate the model with and
without the neighborhood variables. Most of the coefficients for
these unpriced attributes have the expected signs. For example, an
increase in noise level reduces home prices, and the visual quality
index has a positive impact. The results of the models also indicate
that structural attribute coefficients in the hedonic equation are
affected very little by the introduction of the location variables in the
model, an unsurprising result considering that construction costs are
typically independent of these attributes. Some differences, however,
do exist between the two models, especially for demographic
characteristics. When the unpriced assets are introduced, the
coefficient for median income is reduced to a non-significant value.
Also, the coefficients for residential density and high school dropouts
have either the wrong sign or are insignificant until the microneighborhood variables are included.
Do and Grudnitski (1995) were the first to empirically estimate
the impact that unpriced golf course assets have on the prices of
adjacent single-family homes. Using data on 717 residential sales in
the San Diego area, they use a hedonic pricing model with a dummy
variable for properties that abut golf courses and other controls such
as age, square footage, number of bedrooms, etc. In their sample,
they employ a matched-pair design to ensure that price premiums for
golf properties are not driven by other location-specific variables or
by systematic differences in the physical characteristics of the houses.
The matched-pair technique in their study is implemented by
including in the sample at least one property in the same vicinity (but
not on the golf course) for every golf course property. Do and
Grudnitski estimate that the price premium paid for homes on golf
courses is approximately 7.6 percent.
Our hypothesis that homes on golf courses are contractual
assurance of open green space is akin to Foldvary’s (1994) view of
territorial collective goods. Foldvary would argue that in our case, the
value of the environmental amenities of these homes on golf
courses—green open space or scenic water and woody views—is
capitalized into the land values of the home sites. Foldvary goes on to
promote the use of site rents or user fees as a stream of revenue to
fund these environmental amenities. We, however, argue that the
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prices of these home sites already incorporate the increased value
from the environmental amenities.
Another underlying theme at the root of this analysis is the
concept of the Environmental Kuznets Curve. Kuznets (1955)
originally suggested that as real income per capita increases, income
inequality increases as well, but then decreases after some turning
point. Thus, as economies grow, income equality follows a U-shape
relationship. There have been other related analyses since Kuznets
that have shown long-term relations between capitalism and
economic equality (Berggren, 1999).
The environmental applications of Kuznets's proposition started
with Grossman and Krueger’s (1995) study of environmental quality
across different countries over several years. Using panel data from
the Global Environmental Monitoring System tracking of urban air
quality in both developed and undeveloped countries, they examined
the relationship between GDP per capita and several measures of
environmental quality. For example, sulfur dioxide, smoke, and heavy
particles are each used as proxies for urban air pollution. Their results
provide strong evidence that increases in GDP are associated with
environmental decay for very poor countries. They find that the
critical turning point occurred at incomes per capita of less than
$8,000 (in 1985 dollars).
IV. Data and Empirical Framework
We have obtained a large golf course database from Sportometrics1
that has already been used in other economics and environmental
work (Limehouse et al., 2010). This database consists of more than
125 golf course characteristics for approximately 15,000 golf courses
in the United States and Canada. To this we have added local and
demographic information, plus some environmental information
(such as Sierra Club membership), which gives us a large and
powerful starting point for economic analysis of the basic and
underlying questions posed in this analysis.
In addition, we have obtained data from Golf, Inc. Magazine2 on
golf course sales from January 2000 to December 2002. This database
1

Sportometrics is a golf course consulting company that licensed its data to us for this
project.
2
Golf, Inc. Magazine is a publication for golf course owners, developers, and
managers.
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lists all courses in the United States that were sold during that time
period, and for most of these courses, the following information is
also provided: (i) the sale price, (ii) whether or not the seller was in
default, (iii) whether the sale was part of the sellers’ liquidation of
non-strategic assets, and (iv) if the buyer plans to develop (or
continue to develop) surrounding land adjacent to the course.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for selected numeric variables
in our databases for golf courses meeting the following
characteristics:
1. All golf course sales from January 2000 to December 2002.
2. Golf course sales for which there is mention in the sales
report that the seller was bankrupt or in default with the
lending agent providing financial capital for the golf course
construction or operation.
3. Sales for which there is mention that the seller sold the
course as part of its liquidation of non-strategic assets. (It
should be noted that the courses in this category are mutually
exclusive from the courses in #2 above.) Sales for which the
buyer plans to develop surrounding land into home sites.
4. All courses in the Limehouse et al. (2010) database.
Courses that were sold between December 2000 and January
2002 are, on average, newer courses. The average age of courses
listed in the sales report is 19 years old, compared to an overall
average of 37 years for all courses. In addition, transactions in which
the seller was in default involve even newer courses (14 years) and
have a smaller standard deviation than all course sales. Total golf fees
(greens plus cart fees per 18 holes) are generally more expensive on
the sold golf courses. However, for sales involving liquidation of
non-strategic assets, the golf fees are, on average, less than those for
all sales and for all golf courses.
Table 2 gives other course characteristics for course sales and for
all courses in our sample. The proportion of sales involving courses
with homes is significantly larger than all courses (73.1 percent versus
41.5 percent). In addition, a larger proportion of course sales is
located in golf communities. There appears to be no pattern in the
data concerning course classifications (public, private, etc.) of course
sales. However, a larger proportion of semi-private courses was sold
during the time period.
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To better analyze the sale prices of courses sold during the
relevant time period, consider the following calculation to estimate
the capitalized (present value) value of each course:

PVj =

( Fees

j

× Rounds j ) − Expenses j
i

=

Cashflows j
i

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Golf, Inc. Sales Data
Variable

Obs
Min
Max
Mean
All sales from Jan. 00 to Dec. 01, n = 127 courses
Sale Price ($)
101
467,500 77,500,000 8,134,079
Course Age
122
1
82
19

SD
13,864,200
14

Total Golf Fee1
117
18
175
64
34
Rounds Per Day
86
44
191
108
31
Sales in which seller was in default, n = 15 courses
Sale Price
14
600,000 20,000,000 3,810,714 5,561,120
Course Age
15
3
31
14
11
Total Golf Fee
12
25
117
52
22
Rounds Per Day
10
60
110
85
17
Sales involving liquidation of non-strategic assets, n = 14 courses
Sale Price
11 1,500,000 6,000,000 2,615,000 1,331,413
Course Age
14
11
39
28
8
Total Golf Fee
14
18
64
40
14
Rounds Per Day
9
44
164
100
43
Sales in which buyer will develop surrounding land, n = 18 courses
Sale Price
14
467,500 20,000,000 5,119,821 5,508,983
Course Age
18
1
40
14
12
Total Golf Fee
17
43
130
63
24
Rounds Per Day
12
55
137
99
23
All golf courses in the Sportometrics database, n = 15,051 courses
Sale Price
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Course Age
15,051
0
124
37
27
Total Golf Fee 15,051
3
375
51
30
Rounds Per Day 9,787
7
464
105
48
1 Calculated

as greens fee plus cart fee per 18 holes.
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where PV is the present or capitalized value of course j, Fees is the
greens fees for each course, Rounds is the number of annual rounds
played on the course, Expenses is the operating maintenance expenses
for the course, and i is the discount rate, assumed to be 8 percent.
Adjustments to the discount rate have little or no impact on the
empirical results.
Table 2: Characteristics of Golf Course Sales
Course Sales
Course Characteristic
Homes on Course
Located in Golf Community
Public Course
Private Course
Semi-Private Course
Resort Course

(Jan 00–Dec 02)1
87 (73.1%)
48 (40.3%)
41 (34.5%)
28 (23.5%)
40 (33.6%)
10 (8.4%)

All Courses2
6,250 (41.5%)
2,728 (18.1%)
6,919 (46.0%)
3,826 (25.4%)
3,236 (21.5%)
910 (6.05%)

1 127

golf course sales from the Golf, Inc. sales report.
golf courses from the Sportometrics database.
Note: Percentages of total courses within each category are reported in
parentheses.
2 15,051

The majority of courses in our database do not provide operating
expenses. For these courses, we estimate cash flows by assuming that
operating expenses are 35 percent of total revenue—the median ratio
of operating expenses to revenues for courses that provide expense
data. Although this may not correctly estimate cash flows for some or
many of the courses, it does allow for an adequate measure for
analyzing the relationship between the variation in golf course
revenues and the sale price of courses. It should be noted that
membership fees make up a substantial proportion of revenues for
private and semi-private courses. Unfortunately, we do not have
adequate data on membership fees to include them in this analysis. It
is, however, ambiguous as to whether the above calculation over- or
underestimates revenues for courses with memberships. Although we
are not including membership fees in the calculation, greens fees are
typically paid only by guests on courses and are not market driven as
in public courses. To accurately calculate course revenue, the data
would have to report the number of rounds played by members and
the number played by guests. This issue is addressed and corrected
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for, in part, by including dummy variables for private and semiprivate courses in any models in which revenues and greens fees are
analyzed.
Golf courses can be appraised very differently for property tax
purposes, and the tax millage that is assessed can differ substantially
from year to year, causing the property tax liability for golf courses to
be quite different across states and even across time for the same golf
course. We are unable to control for these differences in property
taxes. We acknowledge that differences in property taxes are more
important in the tax treatment between private (for-profit) versus
public (tax-exempt or municipal-owned) courses, and we include
dummy variables to control for these differences.
Although it has been suggested to us that the cost of water may
be important to our analysis, we are of the opinion that because many
U.S. golf courses do not pay to use water, but instead use surface
water or well water, that this factor is not critical. We acknowledge
that surface or well water has value in terms of opportunity cost, but
because the correlation between these and municipal water varies so
dramatically across the land, we take the position that water cost
differences do not materially impact our results. According to
Throssell et al. (2009, Table 10), only 14 percent of U.S. golf courses
use municipal water as a source for irrigation. Furthermore, we
believe that any differences in property tax rates, water prices, and
other operating costs would be reflected in the capitalized value we
calculated. Generally, golf courses that face higher property tax rates,
water prices, or other operating costs would presumably pass along
these costs to their customers and charge higher prices for their
services. These higher prices would result in a higher present value of
cash flows.
V. Results
1. Golf Course Recapitalization
Table 3 presents model results of course sale prices regressed on
capitalized course value, course yardage, course age, and dummy
variables for the following characteristics: 1) homes on the course, 2)
golf community, 3) seller in default, 4) non-strategic asset sale, 5)
buyer to develop surrounding land, and 6) course type for private,
public, and semi-private courses (resort courses serve as the excluded
group). As expected, the capitalized value coefficient is positive and
highly significant but is not statistically equal to one, indicating that
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factors other than expected cash flows explain some of the variation
in sale prices. The coefficients for public, private, and semi-private
courses show that resort courses are sold at higher prices, indicating
that other revenue-generating amenities may be included in these
transactions. Insignificant coefficients in the regression are golf
community, seller in default (both of these are marginally significant),
buyer to develop surrounding land, and course age. The coefficient
for homes on the course is positive and significant at the 5 percent
level, indicating a $7.6 million premium for golf courses with
residential development on site. While the buyer to develop
surrounding land variable attempts to capture some of this effect, the
homes on course variable indicates that these courses are sold at a
premium. On the other hand, courses sold as part of the seller’s
liquidation of non-strategic assets are sold at an average discount of
$9.4 million. In the sales data, all courses that were sold in this
Table 3: Golf Course Sales: OLS
Dependent Variable: Sale Price
Variable
Intercept
Capitalized Value
Homes on the Course
Golf Community
Seller in Default
Non-strategic Asset Sale
Buyer to Develop
Course Yardage
Course Yardage Squared
Course Age
Course Age Squared
Public Course
Private Course
Semi-private Course
R-squared
Observations

Parameter
Estimate
60,854,316
0.47
7,577,273
-4,525,501
-5,218,685
-9,441,105
-1,848,272
-18,757
1.94
-569,261
19,579
-23,490,234
-23,650,519
-28,402,542
0.81
68

Standard
Error
(22,797,753)
(0.10)
(3,374,439)
(2,711,579)
(3,306,425)
(4,248,701)
(3,037,713)
(10,120)
(1.03)
(552,400)
(11,967)
(4,142,390)
(4,654,482)
(3,984,079)

*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, and * p-value < 0.10.

***
***
**

**
*
*

***
***
***

116 F.F. Limehouse et al. / The Journal of Private Enterprise 27(2), 2012, 103–120

category had homes. This may provide evidence for the notion that
once course developers sell housing lots, the golf operation is sold to
management companies at a discount. The summation of the homes
on course and non-strategic asset coefficients ($1.8 million) is an
estimate of the net discount for courses sold with homes. Due to the
large standard errors of both coefficients, the hypothesis that the sum
of these coefficients is equal to zero cannot be rejected.
2. Other Data Considerations
Our database provides course characteristics that may be factors
in golf courses as surrogate green spaces. As environmental demand
increases and as population and crowding grow, a new market
potential has emerged to use golf courses as wildlife refuges and
green space to complement land development. As a proxy to identify
courses that operate, in part, to meet an environmental demand for
open space, we consider golf clubs that have homes adjacent to the
course. These homes are not necessarily part of golf communities
developed specifically for home sites. At some point, however, it
would seem that some creative contracting and environmental
entrepreneurship captured part of the demand for open space by
building homes on courses. The data indicate that the average age of
courses with homes is statistically less than the average age of courses
without homes.
The binary logit model reported in Table 4 estimates the
determinants of whether courses have homes. The explanatory
variables are 1) course age, 2) course classification (private, public,
etc.), 3) the proportion of the county population that are members of
the Sierra Club, 4) county population per square mile, 5) county
housing units per square mile, 6) year 2000 per capita personal
income in the county where the course is located, 7) the level of real
GDP per capita (in year 2000 dollars) at the time the course was
constructed, and 8) whether the course is environmentally certified
by Audubon International.
The coefficient on course age is negative and highly significant,
indicating that newer courses are more likely to have homes on the
course, providing some indirect evidence that we are on the
downward sloping portion on an Environmental Kuznets Curve and
that the demand for environmental quality rises once the income
threshold is reached.
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Table 4: Homes on Golf Courses: Binary Logit
Dependent Variable: [1 = Homes on Course; 0 = No Homes on
Course]
Variable
Intercept
Course Age
Proportion Sierra Club
Public Course
Private Course
Military Course
Semi-private Course
Population Per Square Mile
Housing Units Per Square Mile
Aububon Certified Golf Course
Per Capita Personal Income
Initial Real GDP Per Capita
Observations

Parameter
Estimate
1.127
-0.018
53.969
-1.55
0.115
-3.014
-0.437
-0.0006
0.001
0.063
-0.00002
0.00001
15,045

Standard
Error
(0.247)
(0.003)
(9.627)
(0.079)
(0.084)
(0.337)
(0.082)
(0.00015)
(0.00037)
(0.072)
(0.000003)
(0.000006)

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
**

*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, and * p-value < 0.10.

The proportion of county population that are members of the
Sierra Club is included to proxy for environmental sensitivity in the
area. This coefficient is positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
This result is consistent with the intuition in that environmentally
sensitive areas are more likely to find creative ways to meet demand
for open space. On the other hand, it is unlikely that members of
activist organizations that promote regulation such as the Sierra Club
would desire to live on golf courses. This proxy, however, attempts
to capture environmental attributes in the area, not the political
climate.3
Public, military, and semi-private courses are all negatively related
to the probability of homes on courses (resort courses serve as the
3

In an alternate model, we also include the proportion of county voters in favor of
the Green Party (Ralph Nader) in the 2000 election. This measure has a correlation
coefficient of 0.45 with the Sierra Club variable. The coefficient on the Green Party
variable in the logit model is negative and significant, and the Sierra Club
coefficient remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
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excluded group for course classification). The coefficients for private
courses and Audubon member courses are both insignificant. County
population per square mile and per capita personal income both have
negative and significant coefficients, whereas the coefficient on
housing units per square mile is positive. The negative coefficient on
county income is seemingly counterintuitive (i.e., it appears to
contradict the Kuznets notion of the positive relationship between
income and the demand for environmental quality). We offer the
explanation that many homeowners in low-income counties have a
desire to sort themselves in exclusive neighborhoods such as golf
communities. Thus, this result provides additional evidence that
courses are being constructed not for recreational golf, but to meet
other ancillary demands for environmental quality and green open
space. We do note, however, that the level of real GDP at the time
the course was constructed (as indicated by our variable Initial Real
GDP per Capita) is positive and significant—indicating that as real
income increases over time, newly built courses are more likely to
have homes.
VI. Conclusion
The first empirical analysis in this paper focuses on data that
report the sales of golf courses from January 2000 through December
2002. These data provide some evidence for the notion that many
courses have recently been forced to recapitalize once home sites
have been sold and that some golf developers enter projects knowing
they will not cover operating expenses, but instead charge price
premiums for home sites located on the golf course. The data
indicate that, relative to other courses in the United States, the vast
majority of courses sold in the relevant two years had homes on the
course and that these courses were, on average, significantly newer
than other courses.
The second empirical analysis examines data on every golf course
in the United States and, in effect, reaches the same fundamental
conclusion as the first empirical exercise. That is, over time, golf
courses are becoming vehicles for contractual assurance of green
open space for homes. We believe that this fundamentally provides
some evidence that markets are increasingly finding creative
contracting mechanisms for satisfying demands for public goods.
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